


Outsourcer or Image User. The client side keys are transmitted to the user. [3]The server side keys are transmitted to the Cloud Server. With the support of the Cloud Server, the KMA recalls the requested key from the system. KMA deals with the less amount of data and it can be easily secured.



Although proposed tile-level encryption scheme 2DCrypt can have less computational and storage overheads than the naive per-pixel encryption, the flexibility of selecting an individual pixel is lost. To allow cloud datacenters to perform operations on the encrypted image, partial homomorphic cryptosystem-based solutions have been proposed. A partial homomorphic cryptosystem exclusively offers either addition or multiplication operations.[4] Paillier, Goldwasser-Micali, Benaloh, Shamir’s secret sharing are among partially homomorphic cryptosystems that support addition. Few works have been proposed for searching encrypted images based on dynamic extraction of image features. Note that the image after the first round of decryption on the cloud server is still encrypted and the Cloud Server cannot learn the secret information contained in the image. To access the image in clear-text, a second round of decryption is required using the user-side key of the Image User (or Image Outsourcer) for the final decryption round.

IV. RESULT



Figure 1: Register form



Figure 2: Home page




Figure 3: shared data viewing form

CONCLUSION

Cloud-based image processing has data confidentiality issues, which can lead to privacy loss. In this paper, we addressed this issue by proposing 2DCrypt, a modified Paillier cryptosystem-based scheme that allows a cloud server to perform scaling and cropping operations without learning the image content. In 2DCrypt, users do not need to share keys for accessing the image stored in the cloud. Therefore, 2DCrypt is suitable for scenarios where it is not desirable for the image user to maintain per-image keys. Furthermore, 2DCrypt is more practical than existing schemes based on Shamir’s secret sharing because it neither employs more than one datacenter nor assumes that multiple adversaries could collude by accessing a certain number of datacenters.

References

- [1] Gentry, “A fully homomorphic encryption scheme,” Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, Stanford, USA, 2009.
- [2] M. Naehrig, K. Lauter, and V. Vaikuntanathan, “Can homomorphic encryption be practical?” IN Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Cloud Computing Security Workshop, 2011, pp. 113–124.
- [3] A. Shamir, “How to share a secret,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, pp. 612–613, November 1979.
- [4] M. Mohanty, W. T. Ooi, and P. K. Atrey, “Scale me, crop me, know me not: supporting scaling and cropping in secret image sharing,” in Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE International Conference on Multimedia & Expo, San Jose, USA, 2013.

- [5] K. Kansal, M. Mohanty, and P. K. Atrey, "Scaling and cropping of wavelet-based compressed images in hidden domain," in *MultiMediaModeling*, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2015, vol. 8935, pp.430–441.
- [6] C.-C. Thien and J.-C. Lin, "Secret image sharing," *Computers and Graphics*, vol. 26, pp. 765–770, October 2002.
- [7] 2DCrypt: Image Scaling and Cropping in Encrypted Domains- Manoranjan Mohanty, Muhammad Rizwan Asghar, and Giovanni Russell