Abstract: Security in different regions of the world is a complex endeavour. The best way to describe regions made of states is ‘regional complex’, this is because it is a composition of states, entities that have ever changing and clashing interests which are best achieved through interdependency. Among other security issues in world regions, election management has never been out rightly a serious challenge to security. In the aftermath of Kenya’s 2007 election management, the East Africa region witnessed what this research considers a Regional Security Complex (RSC) with many challenges which this study attempted to interrogate. The challenges of elections management tended to affect the operations of the progressively building regional East African Community (EAC) among others since a focal partner’s stability was at stake to the extent of hampering trade (imports and exports), transportation, and manufacture. In addition to these, it affected some people to extents of becoming refugees. To make the study useful for researchers in as far as challenges of elections management to security in a regional complex is concerned, the author made attempts to; find causes of insecurity in East Africa region, examine how Kenya’s 2007 election’s management effects replicated to security of her neighbouring countries, analyze the general effects of Kenya’s 2007 electoral management to neighbouring countries, and finally, it assessed the spillover effects of election management insecurity to neighbouring counties. Through these objectives, it became apparent that causes of insecurity in world’s geographically interlinked states have similarities, challenges of elections management to security in a regional complex such as East Africa are affected by the stability of focal states, and that cross border spillovers affect power structures of states and ultimately regional politics as in Africa’s young regionalization. Indeed, issues of national security in the interdependent world are international security by nature. This research used a case study design purposively conducted and by collecting data using questionnaires across the study scope. The SPSS tool aided the researcher in additional analysis.

Keywords: Elections Challenges / Elections Management/ Regional Security/ Regional Complex/ Kenya’s Election

I. INTRODUCTION

The electoral management just like the 2007 in Kenya have real challenges not only internal to states but also externally in regionally connected group of states. These under normal circumstances also extend to breed regional security complex. In other words, election management traditionally affects national security. The subject national security is composite in nature. There are five sectors to which the concept of national security applies: military, political, economic, societal and environmental according to Stivachtis (1999). These sectors according to Mwalimu (Undated) are so interdependent that changes in one sector, whether positive or negative, affect other sectors. This means that if and when refugees affect one security sector, by the same token they affect other security sectors.

II. BACKGROUND

Kenya’s elections like its counterparts in the region have been prone to manageable violence except the 2007 which became a regional security concern. These elections and a few more in Africa seem to point a trend towards regional security because of the experiential cross border effects the Kenyan Post Election Violence (PEV) had. Is it due to increased regionalization?

This study examined the probable challenges the 2007 electoral management posed in order to find a way out of such. In so doing, it identified a number of these challenges to both Kenya and its other partners. Kenya being a host of UN Habitat headquarters means possible implications to the entire world. The many peace initiatives which have been negotiated in Kenya like the Sudan and Somali have functional secretariats in the country. The International Great Lakes Region secretariat operates at Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi. Kenya as a transit Country to virtually the wider East and Central Africa with its highly developed infrastructure comparatively was in flames and this meant an economic backlash in the East Africa region. These coupled with the cultural disjoints (interconnectedness) among the ethnic communities for a number of years since the Western partition politics add insurmountable fear on regional security complexities.

The existing patterns of conflict across the borders and within East African Countries cannot be better described if not within the confines of Regional Security Complex (RSC) to solicit a new thinking of securitization not used before. In this region especially that has had external invasions from slavery, to colonialism which further dispersed African nations into different countries and further splitting nations into multinational states and seeking their harmony.

The researcher’s concern was about how electoral management with its inherent risks is likely to complicate the regional security in a wider region. Many attempts in this area of study have emphasized on the real application of defense systems. It is hoped that by such a paradigm, the states can find better ways of tailoring their security apparatus to meet the growth of this complexity by inter-linking strategies or state plans. As in other developing states in Africa, and elsewhere in the globe, it seems that this area under study is much more prone to a number of security complex threats from elections in its latest decades.
Buzan and Waever in Regions and Power; Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) view regional security complexes arising from any cause as requiring an approach of security interdependence and securitization among states linked geographically. This is expounded by the inter-dependence nature of the world due to globalization. The applicability in this scenario where a state’s security fabrics break like in Kenya due to elections might require institutionalization of electoral linked regional security measures in the contemporary world for geographically adjacent states.

In determining the effects of electoral management in Kenya in 2007 to East Africa regional security, the research findings will be relevant to organizations that deal with security issues. This involves the government, the regional bodies such as EAC security organs, IGAD, IC/GLR secretariat, AU, and other global states which will benefit on this information for strategic reasons. For EAC states, the significance of the impact means continuity of its progressiveness or interference to the eco-socio-political strides currently in place. To IGAD and IC/GLR states, the electoral management affected the planned and ongoing regional security issues being addressed in Nairobi thus severing some operational links.

Finding out the effects of Kenya’s 2007 electoral management on Kenya’s neighbours is a significant step towards both regional policies and state policies. This is very important to immediate states; Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and by extension to Rwanda and Burundi. These effects range from economic to social which turn often to security/insecurity dynamics. Whereas the effects differ to landlocked countries as opposed to Countries accessible to the Indian Ocean such as Somalia and Tanzania, the issue of traditional membership to East African Community compounds more effects. In addition, the issue of economic dependency to Kenyan strong industrial base and hitherto hosting and playing host to regional peace initiatives to countries such as Sudan/ South Sudan and Somalia. This built paradigms on stability issues emanating from piracy and Al-shaabab and its likelihood spill over.

In analyzing electoral process, it is notable that security complexities are very inherent. Security complexities range from within the institution that run the elections, the state institutions, other institutions within the state which are not government related, and external institutions bound by the international framework of states. There is somehow institutional involvement at all levels which attributes to regional security from this exercise, elections. The stability of such institutions seems not to be an option for regional security realization.

Within the mix of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), therefore, the research attempts to find how such institutions (local and regional) can be caused to be avenues of regional security. Is it by securitization/security community (institutions) or through non-security electoral institution within the region? The lines of argument consider issues of state sovereignty and non-interference principles among state relations. Similarly, it is important to question sovereignty amidst in capacity to survive as a state.

**III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

Is elections management security remote to affected states? In answering the question raised, gap is enhanced; states in a geographic region exist under complex polities which spread to economic and social aspects. In the current dispensation of interdependency of states in many fronts, traditional security has been weakened through the existing porous nature of borders thus challenges of elections management to security have substantial cross border spillovers effects which weaken the power and strength of states in a regional complex. This in essence enhances their internal and external insecurity and this is serious to countries which are progressively trying to build cohesive regional regimes in Africa. Challenges of elections management in a region does not only lead to the refugees’ menace as a problem to neighbouring states due to violence such as the Kenya’s 2007 election, it has other challenges too. In the East Africa region because of two states with coast lines along Indian Ocean, Kenya boasting of good infrastructure thus attracts more of Uganda’s imports passing through the port of Mombasa, as do most of Rwanda’s exports. The Kenya’s elections management insecurity in 2007 made Uganda lose tremendous millions because of the delays, destruction of goods and slowed production caused by the Kenyan crisis. Much more, the other landlocked countries such as Burundi, and the infant South Sudan that depends on Kenya for stabilizing its economy and human resource sectors.

**IV. OBJECTIVES**

This study was guided by the following objectives;

i. To find out causes of insecurity in East Africa region.
ii. To examine how Kenya’s 2007 election’s management effects replicated to security of her neighbouring countries.
iii. To analyze the general effects of Kenya’s 2007 electoral management to neighbouring countries, and
iv. To assess the spillover effects of election management insecurity to neighbouring countries.

**V. METHODOLOGY**

This research used a case study design purposively conducted and by collecting data using questionnaires across the study scope. The SPSS tool aided the researcher in additional analysis.

**IV. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY**

This research used Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) as its theoretical framework. The theory is multi-dimensional and has been applied in different settings as a way of theorizing securitization. Within the neo-liberal regime, the international entities have complementing effect relations that make it necessary for sharing security.

Buzan and Waever have defined regional security complexes as follows: The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones, security interdependence is normally defined into regionally based clusters: security complexes. [...] Process of securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence are more intense between actors inside such complexes ... (Buzan and Waever, 2013). The regional security complexities arising out of electoral management seem to have been constantly building and increasing with the sunset of cold war into the period marked by calmness from the conflicts of coups and takeovers (Juma and Oluoch, 2012).

Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) has been used in different scenarios by scholars in attempts at arriving at regional security solutions. In these attempts, it is recognized that national militaries remain the principal actors in security among states. The issues though arising with effects of globalization, integrations, and governance lead to creation of...
porous borders and dilemmas which cooperate security can solve. The common lines of thought addressed many RSCTs surround; the role of insular/outlier states, the use of regional security community, and the role dominant powers in shaping local security concerns and imperative of security interdependence.

According to Buzan and Waever (2003), writings on “Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security”, the concept of regional security complexes covers how security is clustered in geographically shaped regions. Security concerns do not travel well over distances and threats are therefore most likely to occur in the region. The security of each actor in a region interacts with the security of the other actors.

There is often intense security interdependence within a region which creates dilemmas between regions, which is what defines a region and what makes regional security an interesting area of study. By making a comparative reflection on Kenya’s 2007 and 2013 elections, the researcher wants to find security concerns arising out of elections management especially in EAC region and the complexities therein inherent.

Regional Security Complex Theory should not be confused with regionalism, a subset of International Relations which is concerned mostly with regional integration. Regionalism is the expression of a common sense of identity and purpose combined with the creation and implementation of institutions that express a particular identity and shape collective action within a geographical region (Juma and Oluoch, 2012).

According to Kammerud, many transitional democracies have socioeconomic, ethnic, political or religious cleavages that may be aggravated by elections (e.g. Kenya, India, Guyana, and Kyrgyzstan). There may be insurgent groups that threaten the integrity of the electoral process … that routinely harms (Kammerud, 2012). What is clearly captured in Kammerud is that the internal dynamics of young democracies are full of insecurity complexes which become security issues.

Waiguchu (2012) poses a key question in matters of election related conflict of which security ranks very high. She asks; Can violence like that of elections be localized or is it obvious that election violence of a national nature has a cross boundary effect thus international in nature? Waiguchu’s question raises arguments, on one hand it is true electoral violence can be localized but on the other hand when the intensity escalates, possibilities of it transcending beyond borders is very high. These schools of thoughts (Localization vs- a-viz Globalization) will guide the theoretical basis for this study. In this regard, globalization school finds itself as an attribute of Regional Security Complex Theory. San Juan 2000 too indicates that, the idea of violence in states as very much having the likelihood of exhibits beyond localization.

With an evidently changing pattern in the nature of conflicts, the possibility of elections management developing another ugly economic, social, and political history in the region need to be checked by the Regional Security Complex (RSC) arrangement for the thriving of East Africa Community (EAC). The changing nature of conflicts tend to show that many intra-state conflicts are becoming electoral related as opposed to the post- independent period characterized by numerous coups and takeovers.

With a very strong assertion, Renner (2005) mentions the changing inter-state security dimensions in interconnected world as, security in a globalizing world cannot be provided on a purely national basis, or even on basis of limited alliances. A multilateral and even global approach is needed to deal effectively with a multitude of trans-boundary challenges (Renner 2005). Regional Security Complex (RSC) involves security issues of states that transcend either one region or within states in one region as East African Region (EAC).

One reason why states may use a dual security approach as postulated by Al-Khalifa may be due to considerations of realists understanding of state sovereignty a concept which seem to bind states despite thriving of neo-liberalism through globalization onslaught. Another issue of consideration for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) states is practice of non-interference policy of state relations which leads to an attempt to avoid conflict. This argument is anchored on a thought that for development to be harnessed there is need for relative stability.

Election’s management resulting conflict and violence cause threats that have wider geographic area that cannot be a Country’s affair because of its likely effects. This poses a challenge to regional security/insecurity among neighbouring states. As it occurs, in the context of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), questions arise whether continual use of long cherished traditional security measures and approaches ‘military – led’ can enhance functional- structural weaknesses.

Election’s management dynamics for regionally connected states qualify the application of the regional security complex theory because of complex processes interwoven with threats which are likely to polarize countries within proximity. Asunka (2013), “electoral process is constituted from a complex series of interdependent sub-processes, generically including: civic education, voter education, voter registration, party registration, candidate nomination, the campaign period, polling operations, tallying and counting, dispute resolution and the official announcement of results. Each of these sub-processes can be characterized by different types of threats, influenced by the particular approach adopted, cross-influence between sub-processes and the individual circumstances of the election.” However, elections following best practices free themselves from threats which are synonymous with poorly conducted elections.

The failure of traditional security approach may lead to change of approach. Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) as stipulated by Buzan and Waever may cater for ensuing security which brings cross border effects even in elections to the geographically adjacent states in an era where factors promoting interdependence in social and economic fronts are ever on the rise (trade/ movements/e.t.c.) then a consideration for non traditional security approaches might well be embraced (security community). Knowing fundamentally that a Country's insecurity is not remote to its neighbours from whichever cause they are likely to antagonize the existing peace and security regionally.

States with their internal dynamics as Al-Khalifa (2009) points remain sovereign entities. In adopting the spirit of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), how then should they carry out securitization without infringing this attribute of state yet still act towards its survival. State survival is an element that means that this entity is not likely to be extinct due to underlying threats. If states are faced with insurmountable threats they can disappear (the world has seen states come and go due to their ephemeral nature). It is on this view that this
study theorizes that weaknesses of states are constant factors. In overcoming them and enhancing survival, states need to build stronger national institutions to address threats facing them or cooperate security wise by developing such institutions at regional level.

Where national institutions don’t seem to deal with its security concerns, a thought of Institutions’ Perspective Theory (IPT) can be attempted. As in Buzan and Waever (2003), security is indeed clustered in regionally networked states, threats have no boundaries and security interdependence is not just a need but intense interdependence. This research therefore wishes to explore whether IPT can enhance this dependency further. When applied at the regional level then it can be referred to as Regional Institutions’ Perspective Theory (RIPT).

Institution theorists may borrow this projection by Scott, institutional theory attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. It considers the processes by which structures, including schemes, rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior. It inquires into how these elements are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into decline and disuse. Although the ostensible subject is stability and order in social life …conformity but to conflict and change in social structures (Scott 2004b).

The major concerns of Regional Institutions’ Perspective Theory (RIPT) surround structures, stability, order, and a reality of decline of institutions. With this in mind, it is thought herein that security complexities can often be evaluated against institutions from time to time. Institutional theory run richly through the formative years of the social sciences, enlisting and incorporating the creative insights of scholars ranging from Marx and Weber, Cooley and Mead, to Veblen and Commons. Much of this work, carried out at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, was submerged under the onslaught of neoclassical theory in economics, behavioralism in political science, and positivism in sociology, but has experienced a remarkable renaissance in our own time. (Bill and Hardgrave, 1981; Hodgson, 1994; Scott, 2001).

VII. DEFINING EAST AFRICA REGION

The East African Community (EAC) is the regional intergovernmental organization of the Republics of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of Uganda, with its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. The Treaty for Establishment of the East African Community was signed on 30 November 1999 and entered into force on 7 July 2000 following its ratification by the original three Partner States – Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The Republic of Rwanda and the Republic of Burundi acceded to the EAC Treaty on 18 June 2007 and became full Members of the Community with effect from 1 July 2007 (EAC 2014). The depiction of this region has undergone changes because initially it had three core states of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania but it has expanded to five Countries with a sixth state of South Sudan’s request to join still pending.

This view is expressed by the map (Habari Network, 2014);

A. Likelihood of elections management causes of insecurity in regions; specific reference to East Africa region

Human Rights Watch (2004) notes that during the 2003 Federal and States elections in Nigeria, at least 100 people were killed and many more were injured. Approximately 600 people were reported killed in the recent election violence in Kenya, following disputes over the results of the December 2007 presidential elections.

Similarly, (Atuobi, 2008) records that during the August 2007 run-off elections in Sierra Leone, violence erupted following a clash between the supporters of the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the opposition All People’s Congress (ACP). Violent attacks were also reported against the supporters of the SLPP when the ACP leader was sworn in as the new Presidents. The persistence of election related insecurities manifest as if they are only found in African continent yet they are global mostly among developing Countries.

In Ebert (2001), election-related violence is defined as political violence aimed at the electoral process. It is geared towards winning political competition of power through violence, subverting the ends of the electoral and political process. The erupting election violence or election-related violence is understood as violent action intended towards some people, property or the electoral process, whose main purpose is supposedly has an end goal to influence the electoral process before, during or after elections. Election violence can therefore aptly be deduced to take two perspectives – cultural and structural. The view point by Ebert seems to ignore other forms arising from election violence; systemic and institutional. On the other hand he deals with a normally formed opinion on African violence.

Jeff Fischer (2002) adopts an argument that it is not the electoral process per se that triggers violence, but the breakdown of this process. Fischer (2002) does not contest the crucial role that elections have in the democratization process. He says, “it is difficult to identify any electoral surrogate that has brought about non-conflictive transitions of power with the same consistency” (2002:2) - but believes that violence is induced by unethical actions that occur during the election cycle and which contribute to the breakdown of the electoral process. In understanding Fischer, the issue about surrogates tell the nature of systems, methods, and technologies which are often borrowed from mature democracies and mostly in the eleventh hour. It is therefore almost certain that incompatibilities are bound to take place out of these in electoral matters. It may be right to suggest that surrogate electoral systems will likely lead to conflicts.
The issues of security above by Newman and Selm can be evaluated thus, security whether in the realms of the state effects or across the border effects is centred on people and hence human security by nature. In the perspective of Kenya’s 2007 electoral management and East Africa regional security, threats to security can emerge or may be rooted in the societies. In light of Kenya’s 2007 election aftermath, what is considered emerging is basically triggered from natural events. A close relationship lies between anthropogenic activities and security as well as natural events and security.

Security within and between states often involve the aspect of human security which encompasses people and their properties. According to realists, security should be carried by states, however, with inherent conditions due to accelerated inter-connections, states are weakened by many factors in neoliberalism regime which calls for reconstruction through the same design. For proper security checks and balances, cooperations can suffice. This design provides institutional support system to back discrepancies arising from the states.

However, the role of states as the effecting entities of interdependency decisions cannot be demeaned. Newman and Selm (2001) aver that contemporary security, if it is to be relevant to changing conditions and needs, must focus on the individual or people collectively… traditional conceptions of state security based on military defense of territory are important but not a sufficient condition for human welfare. This portrays a connection with Buzan and Waever’s thesis of intra security linkages among states.

For the region in study (the East African Community sub-region), fundamental research findings that the researcher will endeavour to find is the possibility of regional security community in the East Africa Region in the wake of election insecurity. As states inter relate in such a security arrangement, what are the likely roles of other actors given the historical background of this part of Africa?

The effects of regionalization and the traditional feeling of statist by some Countries and foreign policy pursuance at the same time will enrich this study. Traditionally, the statist in Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) always perceive national military as the prime actors in regional security within their borders. Whereas RSCT postulates an environment where jeopardized security may call for serious military relation, in this region, with peripheral states like (Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and South Sudan) yet closely attached to the region and which region is in constant experience of internal instabilities, one can ask whether a supra security organization can do better. In this sense it calls for evaluating possibilities of cooperate strategies to single- entity strategies.

Buzan and Weaver put it thus cooperations among states in security matters is not an option by the fact of being set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.... Processes of securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence are more intense between the actors inside such complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and those outside it, Al- Khalifa (2012) defines this complex as; RSCs are defined by durable patterns of animosity and enmity.... Historical hatreds and friendships, as well as specific issues that trigger conflict or cooperation, take part in the formation of an overall constellation of fears, threats, and friendships (Buzan and Waever, 2013). It is agreeable to note the kinds of patterns that emerge among neighbouring states.
Points of differences arise where classical realism is exercised whereas interdependency develops where a single state as an entity cannot tackle its issues and where also the spread is likely to be detrimental to international peace.

Still in Regional Security Complex, Wayne (2014) observes that, States that exist on the periphery of regions have a conspicuous role in the international system that has consistently challenged scholars. Here, minor states such as Afghanistan and Vietnam have shaped great power politics despite their relatively weak strength and positions in international affairs. Realist approaches have sidestepped these outlier states by calling them buffers or proxies.

Neo-liberalist perspectives have generally ignored states that paradoxically have had an impact on international relations that is disproportionate to their economic wealth and institutional engagement. Turkey represents an excellent case through which to examine these so-called ‘outlier’ states as in Wayne. Turkey has traditionally occupied a position at the periphery of both Europe and the Middle East, and until recently has shared the traits of many other outlier states by articulating a neutralist foreign policy.

The position of outlier/peripheral states even though very confusing where they belong in a region have had some impact to the region’s security. Turkey therefore fits into a hybrid web of constructivist-structuralist Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) here. Waiuchu (2012) contends with the subject of elections having extra territoriality effects which in themselves are security concerns. It is in a way confirming that localization localization of security concerns emanating from election management is not a possibility for regionally adjacent states.

Without a doubt, the whole area of non-traditional security – whether it be threats, issues or challenges...has come to occupy a prominent place on the regional security agenda in recent years (Rolls, 2010). Menon thinks that this is very much in keeping with the ‘widenings’, or ‘broadenings’, of the security agenda which has occurred internationally (Menon, 2010). Threats and other relevant challenges as Rolls suggest to be taking eminence in regional security are widespread. They range from human migrations (forceful and voluntary), cross border crimes, and electoral management effects in states with cultural disjoints making nations finding their bases in two states or more is worrisome. These kinds of challenges as seen in East Africa Region need to keep with the dynamics of contemporary security agenda. The possible architect may need to adopt non-traditional security which allows a zone of community securitization.

Peter Hough writing on security issues, threats, and challenges has argued, “whilst there is a case to be made that military threats in the twenty-first century are as apparent as ever and may be even greater than during the Cold War, the simple fact remains that they are not the only threats that face states, people and the world as a whole” (Hough, 2004:7). The assertion by Hough is supported with a degree of reasonable solution similar to Rolls and Melon. “Threats can emanate from other sectors, and thus the security agenda should be widened accordingly, is something which has gained increasing recognition amongst political leaders and policymakers” (Washington, 1994:1).

Regionalism has many benefits to date to states. The benefits range from economic, social, and political. To benefit from such, it is recognized that violence arising from elections management like other non-traditional security issues have effects on states and can have beyond state implications (extra-state impact) thus a potent to regional and international stability. Other insecurities in these categories include trafficking, piracy, terrorism, economic crimes, and arms smuggling among many. In the wake of such, should states wait to see workable models of security regional by nature before embarking on theirs? This is the dilemma that many regions such as East Africa Region (EAR) find itself in. Electoral management can be one of such threats to warrant need for a workable security architect beneficial to the EAR states.

The security concerns in East Africa Region period since independence are a reality. Why? The attention that it draws from the continental body African Union (AU), East African Community (EAC), and Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) portray a place that is insecure. Not only is the region insecure, it also experiences security complexities by the fact that within the states themselves, there are internal dynamics that portend security threats beyond the states. This divergent institutional membership is interesting because it illustrates the complexity of the environment in which these security institutions operate. The Countries have different past colonialism orientations (Anglophone and Francophone) and the way ideological war was played on this scene is all signs of the complexities.

The complexities as diverse as they are illustrate how states and institutions in the region differ considerably in their perception of security; including their understanding of what issues in the region represent the most pertinent threats and what their ideas about how best to overcome such threats are (Jacobsen, 2013). It is somehow true that the need for security and economic well being pushes Countries in this region to cluster in a number of inter-state outfits in a bid to seek survival.

In attestation to the existing security condition in the East Africa Region, the East African Community (EAC) in its Peace and Security Strategies points to peace and security as pre-requisites for the success of the EAC Region Integration process. It is against this background that the Council of Ministers, upon recommendation by the Sectoral Committee on Inter State Security established an experts group to develop a Regional strategy supported by a practical implementation plan. The strategy was adopted by the 13th Council of Ministers meeting, held in November 2006 to guide EAC level interventions in the Peace and Security Sector (EAC, 2014). The Peace and Security Sector, remains very committed and dynamic in order to respond to the nature and form of the ever evolving security threats.

Article 124 of The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, recognizes the need for peace and security within the East African States (EAC, 2014). The question is whether the commitment has been backed with a real response. Another area to really think of is going beyond round-table/ paper-work agreements to facing security concerns of the region. Still, as much as such strategies may exist, the development of electoral management security and other intra-state conflicts which are likely to pillage may require effective Extra- State Security Arrangement (ESSA), or Intra- State Security Arrangement (ISSA) built around RNS. The current strategy seems to stop at ‘this will provide a good and conducive environment for peace and security’.

Another dilemma that has faced the East Africa Regional (EAR) security has had to do with inter-state suspicions,
historical coups, existence of rebels, tribal/ethnic animosities, failed states, and currently the terrorism issue and the manner of intervention in national security matters which have external effects. With this environment, is there likely to be a need for Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) within the states or among states neatly linked or can it call for Inclusive Security Response (ISR)? This study tries to explore these lines of thought by using RSCT of Buzan and Waever in mind.

As neo-liberalism spread through the forces of globalization, Aning (2007) builds an argument that due to the interconnectedness among key actors and players in Africa’s conflicts, one should begin to describe them as security complexes. They can be understood within a thematic context, namely in terms of the trans-nationality.

B. Examining how Kenya’s 2007 election’s management effects replicated to security of her neighbouring countries

The 2007 election as earlier stated had much security concerns for the region. It shocked the Country and world, it lasted for two months, about 1,133 Kenyans were killed, over 600,000 displacements occurred and loss of more than 110,000 private properties (Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, 2013). These properties could in no way belong to Kenyans only. Kenya is a transit route to many East Africa Region (EAR) states, it is also a business destination with many industries to the neighbouring states and a dependent economic state to Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) Countries. The cropping of Post Electoral Violence (PEV) as here indicated above experienced in Kenya from the 2007 elections and the security surrounding it did not just emanate from no basis.

The poor management of conflicts in Kenya has been leading to conflicts with the 2007 an 2008 being the worst ever witnessed scenario. It led to increased prices of goods not only in Kenya but also her neighbours who depend on Kenyan port. For example the cost of fuel increased tremendously overnight and remained high for months. The PEV would pose a threat to the East African Community because of the role that the Kenyan state has had. The uncompromising stances from Kenya and Uganda in the dispute pose a threat to the dreams of East African Integration that the East African Community is working to realise. Logically, a state entering conflicts with the other would lead to closing of borders (Warui, 2013).

In this research the impact of electoral management dynamics in the East Africa region reflects itself much as a human security. Acharya and Acharya (2001), posits, human security, however addresses more general threats to human existence and ways to overcome them. The emerging notion of ‘world system’ is based on the key human security postulate that peace and security need to be refocused away from the state toward human rights and equality in resources, health and environment, among other things. To them, competition for power and relative gains are regarded as natural conditions within any state system. It is normal for states to compete and struggle for power- both the realists and neo-liberals assert imply this to describe states’ existence differently.

States struggle for power and competition can exist at bilateral, multilateral, and regional levels. The institutional perspective thinking in a security complex occurs in attempt to address common security dilemmas. One way through which this is possible is a thought of creation of order. For rationalists “[o]rder…can be achieved not only simply through the manipulation of power but through the growth of the society of states” as well (Wheeler and Booth, 1992: 7). The commitment of states to norms, principles and international law increases the degree of certainty that they will be obeyed, which, in turn, reduces unpredictability in the international system (Starr, 1995: 299-315). Understanding electoral management impact as a cause for human security at national level and regionally is also about comparing justice and order.

Once such intra-state impacts have occurred and developed inter-state effects, how can human security be attained and where? If not locally, then regionally. According to Wheeler (2000), there are two rationalist approaches to humanitarian interventions, namely, pluralist and solidarist perspectives. According to him, scholars that generally focus on how the rules of international society provide for an international order among states sharing different conceptions of justice are defined as pluralists. The scholars that look to strengthen the legitimacy of international society by deepening its commitment to justice are identified as solidarists.

For pluralist approach, it is states and not individuals being the principle bearers of rights and duties: The common good of this inclusive community [of states] resides not in the ends that some, or at times even most, of its members may wish collectively to pursue, but in the values of justice, peace, security, and co-existence, which can only be enjoyed through participation in a common body of authoritative practices (Nardin, 1983).

On the other hand, according to solidarists’, the protection of human rights is understood as important for the preservation of order and legitimacy in the society of states. Walzer (1992) suggest the right of states rest on the consent of their members over a long period of time, through shared experiences and cooperative activity of many different kinds shaping a common life and understandably most states do stand guard over the community of their citizens, at least to some degree: that is why we assume the justice of their defensive wars.

On the basis of Regional Institutional Perspective Theory (RIPT), there is a growing tendency of failures in the pluralist approach towards attainment of justice and order especially for the citizens which needs supplementing through application of solidarist approach. However the application of the pluralists and solidarists may be different, they have similarities. Pluralists also believe in participation in a common body of authoritative practices which might in a sense be Extra State Structure in nature.

The dispute over Migingo Island took a different direction in 2009 when Uganda deployed its forces and began engaging in taxation to the Kenyan populations occupying the Island which led to outbursts in the diplomatic relations between the two countries (Gettleman, 2009). There have been efforts to find solution from the two governments although each side would be seen to having pre-determined destiny of owning the Island. The year 2013 for example led to ministers from Uganda and Kenya meeting to discuss on the issue which instead increased the levels of tensions. The Ugandan government would further go ahead to hoist its flag and her police officers harassing Kenyan fishermen signifying their dominance and control of it (Kisiangani, 2011).

The fishing exercise in Migingo Island is understood to be one of the fish rich zones that would boost the economic developments of a state through exportation. The sending of Kenya police to the Island would also be seen as a source of diplomatic tensions. From the researcher’s point of view, the Migingo Island issue could have taken a different direction being contributed by the violence that rouged Kenya after the
2007 elections as Uganda would host several Kenyan displaced populaces. The dispute would not have been amicably solved further because of the fear by the incumbent 2013 election winner president Uhuru Kenyatta. This could be attributed to the efforts of President Museveni’s influence of African Union to advocate for the return of the ICC cases and that Kenyan President is judged in Kenya.

The dependency of Kenya by Uganda in receiving goods could be the possible reasons that prevented wars. The 2007 PEV would spread its conflict spill over’s to the neighbours with several victims dying estimated at 1200 with more being displaced to the neighbouring countries with multiples being IDPs (Gibson and Long, 2009). The fear of Kenya witnessing her citizens that had settled in Uganda suffering and Ugandan government fear of her goods that pass through the port of Mombasa could be the main reason for a diplomatic situation.

Kenya has natural port in Mombasa that serves Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Sudan and Burundi. Violence in Kenya thus means that the countries would face challenges. These countries as a result of the 2007 PEV had transportation problems. There goods remained within Kenya and they had little to do other than calling for an end to the conflict. Trade supplies would not be successful for example to Uganda and Congo (GoK, 2008). The Kenyan relation with Uganda and Tanzania was not at ease as oil supplies to their states was disrupted by various numbers of youth who would guard the borders. There was perception of Kenya’s affairs being interfered by Uganda because of the relation established by the first term of the Kibaki regime for example the perception that Ugandan soldiers had been sent to Kenya by President Yoweri Museveni. This hardened the youth’s perception to the extent of disregarding Uganda.

Violence in Kenya means a lot to her neighbours as the impacts are not only felt in the country, but also by the landlocked neighbours of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo and Southern Sudan, because they rely on Kenya for imports and exports (Smith, 2008). The Coast and Rift Valley are strategic for transportation of goods to these countries. For example the major sea transport at the port of Mombasa passing through Kibera slum in Nairobi and the Rift Valley to Uganda.

This linkage in the transport sector plays an important role in the unification process of East Africa region. The 2007-2008 PEV is a classic example of economic crises that is posed if security is destabilized as there would be interruption of port services due to vandalization of the railway which would paralyse transport hence having subsequent results like severe oil shortages in Uganda, Congo, Congo and Southern Sudan (Smith, 2008).

Human Rights Watch, (2008) points out to the violence during electoral periods in Kenya estimated to have killed at least 4,433 people and displaced over 1.8 million since the acceptance of the multi-party system in 1991. Electoral problems are as a result of ethnicization of Kenyan politics accompanied by corruption, non-adherence to the rule of law, a centralized and highly personalized form of governance, inequitable development and a “winner-takes-all” form of politics perceived as benefiting one ethnic constituency to the detriment of all others.

Stricter realism proponents will hold on according to Bassey (1993), the conventional security threats, which are associated with a foreign element or government and is usually responded to according to conventional practice and doctrine following laid down pattern. However, a second typology of security threats have been defined as, (Alli, 2012) “new or emerging security threats” and are generally non-governmental, dynamic, random and driven by variety of causes and forces. This category includes electoral management security in a wider regional perspective.

Regional security architecture may not just take place out of normal diplomacy among cooperating states. Such incidences are few in case they occur. In most cases, they occur for specific issues either at bilateral or multilateral levels to fix impasses between affected countries. However, sub- regional and regional security architecture type arise from major experiential requiring response to save cause for humanity now and in future.

Electoral management and security from Kenya’s 2007 experience reveals how this democratic process can lead to crisis. In the wake of the Somali crisis (1993) and the genocide in Rwanda (1994) and the reluctance of the powerful members of the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) to approve new UN missions for Africa, the African regional and sub-regional organisations were forced to develop their own security mechanism (Adetajb;2004: 3).

Articles 16 of the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) protocol for example provides that regional mechanism shall be part of the security architecture of the Union. The AU security architecture is informed by the new security threats and provides for collective approach to the security challenges of the continent, accepting the sovereignty of all members and a prominent position for Regional Economic Communities (RECs); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South African Development Community (SADC), East African Economic Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The AU framework, which was set up in 2002, has a Peace and Security Council (PSC), a permanent body on peace and security with the responsibility for managing collective security and working in cooperation with RECs.

As observed by Sesay, Amadi, and Ikouni, (2010:55), ECOWAS possesses the most sophisticated conflict prevention management, peace-building and peace-keeping mechanism on the continent. Amidst many weak attempts, the security frameworks are increasingly bearing fruits in West Africa. The military coups in Guinea in December 2008, in Guinea Bissau in March 2009 and in Niger in February, 2010 have paralyzed democratic gains but notably as an example Niger was suspended by the ECOWAS an incident where President Mamadou Tandja was overthrown for attempting a constitutional coup.

Against this background, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has evolved a democratic framework to prevent future coups in the region (SADC, 2002). The 2007 PEV and events subsequently have casted Kenya as the main reason for the dilemma situation.

Currently, Africa in general and East Africa Region is grappling with several difficult security challenges. These difficulties result not only from the magnitude of these challenges, but also from the lack of capacity of African states and organizations to respond quickly and effectively to them. It is good to audit the existing security arrangements if they are adequate and poses the capacity to handle security that evolves. The 2007 electoral management opened up avenues of challenges that EAR states may in future need to address; behavior of Uganda and rumours of its military presence in the African Union to advocate for the return of the ICC cases and that Kenyan President is judged in Kenya.
some parts of Kenya indicated that the East African Community (EAC) cohesion is very fluid, the question of stable states seem to be far off from this region by observing Kenya’s degeneration in 2007, and the choice of Tanzania’s participation through track II diplomacy is something to evaluate in terms of regional security.

Although Africa’s current security challenges are predominantly governance-related or intra-state conflicts, the continent’s ill-defined national borders remain a potent source of instability. In fact, more than half of all African Countries have engaged in boundary-related conflicts, and border disputes are a strong undercurrent affecting ongoing regional crises in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. Africa’s regional bodies need to develop stronger mechanisms to manage the disputes and threats that arise across the continent’s many uncertain boundaries (Ikome, 2012).

Security challenges according to Jourde (2012) is all about the complexity of the threats, the region’s threats are more complex than what is observable on the surface. I concur that from the 2007 electoral management dynamics, security complexities reveal an unexpected latent effect that reveals the lives of the East African Community Countries depend on each other since the Kenyan problem had immediate effects in Ugandan and Rwanda economies. The South Sudan also felt the effects related to infancy and dependence to a superior regional partner who mid-wifed their Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

To evaluate the challenges further, security concerns are typically characterized by multiple, competing, and fluctuating interests at the local, national, and regional levels. Effectively responding to these threats requires in-depth understanding of the multiple contextual layers in which illicit actors operate. This may require mechanism with equivalent approach to Fer the complexities.

Are security challenges possibly going to diminish with major transitions taking place? As there are rapid transitioning so the expectation of rapidly reshaping Africa. (Jakkie Cilliers, Barry Hughes, and Jonathan Moyer (2012); Economic growth has accelerated, longstanding conflicts are being addressed, and support for democracy is widespread. However, rapid urbanization and changing economic structures are amplifying sociopolitical disruption and crime and domestic militia are growing. These challenges are typically complex and intertwined. Reversing them will ultimately require building more effective and accountable state institutions.

According to Sharamo and Ayangafac (2011), the main variables that will determine Africa’s capacity to confront emerging security challenges and response to these threats such as the emergence of food crises, poor service deliveries, organized crime, drug and human trafficking, unconstitutional changes of governments and electoral violence are not only need for pro-growth policies, but also redistributive policies anchored on positive relationships between human and regime security, or a positive alignment between political incentives and good economics. From their argument conclusions can be drawn that point major aspects of security threats to Africa where electoral management is inclusive.

Aning (2007) suggests that within this context of regionalism and the challenges posed to cooperative security in Africa, a number of factors become central to the success of the process of entrenching cooperative security, if Africa is to move beyond its present formalism. Some of the key elements that need to be considered in any scenario building are; understanding the nature of the post-colonial state and the nation-building project in Africa, subscribing to and institutionalizing core regional values and norms, focusing on deepening democratic and open governance, strengthening developmental regionalism as a means of addressing the negative aspects of globalization, establishing the parameters of genuine continental and global partnerships including role clarification between sub regional bodies.

Though in Aning’s following explication, there is an observable lack of reality to the security dynamics currently facing Africa. Aning’s assertion is true to the extent that security systems are government based which are headed by politically interested parties. That is why he asserts, the short to medium term, the critical human, regional, and international security challenges facing Africa can be summed up as a nexus between what I term as ‘old’ and ‘new’ challenges. ‘Old’ security challenges are characterized by perennial armed conflicts, for example the Chad/Sudan tensions or the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict among others, underpinned by the easy availability of Small Arms Light and Weapons (SALW), political violence, and food insecurity. The ‘new’ challenges are nourished by the ‘old’, giving rise to public health problems, massive migration, and increasingly ungoverned and ungovernable spaces within which individuals with terrorist affiliations and other opportunistic groups can exploit and threaten human, regional, and international security. In a broader sense, Aning is very accurate in capturing security challenges of which some have to date been succumbed.

Electoral challenge especially in matters of management has bedeviled Africa for so long; the hurdle has not only crippled electoral management but also electoral democracy. Other challenges that are common place in Africa include the following; absence of the culture of succession through the ballot box which many incumbent African political elites have completely embraced, even after serving their terms as enshrined in the constitutions. Finally, there exist the weaknesses of institutions among them those having the responsibilities for managing elections viz; Election Management Bodies (EMBs).

In the current scenario for instance, electoral roller coasters have clearly manifested in political crises of South Sudan, Sudan (Khartoum), Lesotho and Burundi that have descendent to conflicts leading to interventions from the United Nations, African Union and other regional bodies such as the Inter governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the southern African Development community (SADC) among others (UNISA, 2015).

Fully fledged violent conflicts have emanated from elections which carve an approximate of 20 to 25% of all elections in Africa (Bekoe, 2010). Cases in point of high profile electoral predicaments includes Kenya post election violence of 2007/8, Zimbabwe (2000 and 2008), and Cote d’ Ivoire (2010-2011) have collectively led to at least four thousand deaths and hundreds of thousands as displaces. From an analytical purview, it is clear that violence triggered by elections kills the loyalty and faith of masses towards the democratic processes over and above the sad reality of the recurrent nature of violence in states that has experienced them before. Since 1963, Kenya has experienced various forms of political and social unrest.

The post-election turmoil of late 2007 and early 2008 was not an anomaly. Similar election-related violence in Kenya
occurred in 1992 and 1997. In the intertribal clashes that erupted in 2007 during the standoff between Mwai Kibaki, and the opposition, Raila Odinga, approximately 1,300 people lost their lives and hundreds of thousands were displaced with Widespread sexual violence against women also marred the post-election landscape.

Like other democratic societies within the East African region, Kenyan has cut a niche in consolidation and institutionalizing the ideals of democracy. It has continually focused on the reforms geared towards revamping EMBs into catalysts for free and fair political competition. For example, after the promulgation of the Kenya’s constitution, giant strides at the right direction have been made especially in the quest for status, powers and functions of electoral commissions which have constituted critical national debates of reformed politics through constitutional review. In other words, successful electoral processes offer means of channeling for instance conflict into respectful and constructive debate.

Kenya’s election management challenge to east Africa became conspicuous when the country almost came at the verge of civil war. The strife evidently exposed the underbelly of many sectors that not only affected Kenya but also its neighboring Countries. According to Ksoll et al (2008), the post election violence significantly reduced the Kenyan flower industry export. Kimani (2009), also acknowledges that tourism which is an industry that brings in 900 million USD was affected by the crisis as tourists were scared about their safety.

Across the frontier, the landlocked countries were utterly affected by the violence; for instance, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi which extensively use Kenyan transportation networks felt the burden of violence immensely. According to Baregu (2008), he opines that Uganda and Rwanda’s export go through Mombasa and this affected them overwhelmingly. Other notable insecurities posed included; transportation networks and frustrated relief aid.

Kenya being a dependable transportation hub in the region, exerted immense frustrations to its neighbors in the wake of the post Election violence of 2007/08. The significance of Kenya as a key transport network is evident from the neighbors’ imports that pass through the Kenyan port of Mombasa. For instance, it is estimated that almost 80% of Uganda’s imports pass through the port as do also the exports from Rwanda. Furthermore, the commercial trade as well as the humanitarian aid to Burundi, the Eastern DRC and the Northern part of Tanzania and South Sudan does also rely on the Kenya’s network for transportation (Kimani, 2008).

In other words, this meant that the overall transportation services stretching from the port of Mombasa to the far reaches of Burundi, DRC and Rwanda were crippled due to the 2007/08 electoral violence that erupted in Kenya. The researcher does not want to take Kimani’s observation wholesome. In East Africa region two ports serve as good entry points; the Dar es salaam port and Mombasa. The former is a stretched route for most of the hinterlands and this gives Mombasa port preference. Two more issues are attached Kenya’s geo-position to her neighbours; her coastal port is modernized in comparison to Dar’, and lastly the infrastructure in most Tanzania’s parts after Arusha make her Northern dwellers prefer using Namanga border to Tarime, Musoma, Mwanza, and Bukoba.

Kimani raises other agreeable critical concerns; during the Kenya 2007/08 PEV emanating as a result of election management gone wrong was the disruption of relief aid flowing from the port of Mombasa to the displaced living in the region. At that time of the violence, it was estimated that an approximate 7 million refugees and other displaced persons were living in the region. The survival of many of them depended on the direct support from the UN World Food Programme and other relief agencies that relied on the port of Mombasa. It is estimated that WFP alone moves 1,000 tonnes of food out of Mombasa port every day of the year which clearly points out the significance attached to the port of Mombasa. The concerns by Kimani overemphasize how the Kenya’s 2007 election affected the region in East Africa region in security terms. This confirms that lines of security threats move among states closely connected, a reason that calls for shared securitization.

In the report by IFES (2013), the disturbances associated with the 2007 elections gave a jolt to the country’s democracy and sent shockwaves through the region. Kenya is considered the “anchor state” of East Africa. The country plays an important role in the cultural, Economic and political life of the region. Kenya is strategically located on the East African coastline and serves as the main business hub for the East African community. The country facilitates trade and transportation throughout the region via its massive seaport in Mombasa.

The researcher concurs with the citation since as an anchor state, Kenya is an inlet and an exit state as far as major business is concerned with the world. This would mean that at any time, the country experiences high populations from across the East and Central Africa region in the country for business. However, it cannot be limited to commerce alone since social ties exist between Kenya and most regional states especially the immediate neighbouring states; Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania.

For the many years that Kenya has experienced relative peace in the East Africa region, the country has played continuous role of natural arbiter in most conflicts in the wider East Africa region. It is pointed in (IFES, 2013) that the strategic importance of Kenya can further be highlighted by the influential role that Nairobi plays in political negotiations between South Sudan and Sudan. Kenya has, in a sense, provided neutral ground on which negotiations between the two countries could be held, and also stood at the forefront of the Regional peace process that yielded the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Kenya, like Uganda and Ethiopia, continues to provide human resources, technical skills, as well as other governmental assistance to the newly independent country of South Sudan.

In making emphasis on another perspective from this scholarly view raised by the literature, it is poignant to point that matters of regional peace also mean regional insecurity. As suggested, when the host for peaceful seekers break, it means an extension of insecurity to the territories seeking peace thus 2007 depicted a real regional insecurity. Spillovers and spillbacks of peace and security occur concurrently among neighbouring states.

C. Analyzing the general effects of Kenya’s 2007 Electoral Management to East Africa Regional Security

The impact of electoral management in general is immense to Countries that neighbor each other as much as it is to the internal dynamics of a state’s stability. It interferes with people’s habitation leading to IDPs, it leads to economic destruction and loss of property, and worst of all it leads to loss of life. Peripherally yet very important, there is a breakage of social fabric of trust in any synchronized society no matter the
degree of its synchronization.

According to Kitiabi (2012), the transport and communication sector was also adversely affected by the violence. Unrest in Nakuru, Narok, Kisii, Kakamega and Naivasha effectively paralyzed transport to the western regions of the Country, with roadblocks erected at regular intervals on the roads. Lorries, commuter buses and private vehicles were burned. Destruction of the Nairobi-Kampala railway at Kibera disrupted supplies to western parts of the Country and Uganda, forcing re-routing to already insecure roads.

VARIOUSLY, TRANSPORT AFFECTS SECURITY IN A NUMBER OF WAYS BEING THE LINK IN TODAY’S COMMERCIALLY CONNECTED WORLD. IT ALSO SERVES TO ALLOW ACCESSIBILITY TO SPOTS WHICH REQUIRE SECURITY OPERATIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF CITIZENS AND THEIR PROPERTIES. FROM KITIABI’S ARTICLE, THE INDICATION OF INTERFERENCE ON NAIROBI-KAMPALA RAILWAY AND COMMUTER TRAVEL BLOCKAGES IMPLY THE EFFECTS WERE FAR BEYOND LOCALIZATION. THUS STATES THAT RELY ON KENYA AS A TRADE (EXPORT AND IMPORT) ROUTES SUFFERED GREATLY.

FROM THIS STUDY, THE DATA COLLECTED FROM THE RESPONDENTS REACHED REFLECT THAT ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT HAVE WIDER EFFECTS BEYOND THE LOCATION WHERE IT IS CONDUCTED. THIS POSITION WAS CONFIRMED BY THE BIGGER MARGIN OF RESPONDENTS WHO AFFIRMED THE QUESTION POSITIVELY THROUGH FINDINGS SUMMARY AT A 91.7 PERCENT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nonetheless, Kiwanuka (2015) is of the view that free and transparent political elections constitute an important and essential step towards successful leadership and democracy. This ultimately unlocks political calm. Kiwanuka proceeds to state that political stability is irrefutably of primary importance in fostering economic and social development and in attracting foreign direct investment to every country. Consolidating peace and security and strengthening this democratic process remains critical to the regional development. This is why the instability in Burundi heightens political fragility and risks not only to the country, but also turns back the region’s efforts towards strengthening democracy- the events pose a major threat to the ongoing political, economic and social development on the East African integration.

On the frequency basis, the extent to which the 2007 Kenya’s electoral management affected was very great. Coupled with respondents who marked very great extent, the totally tally showing how the electoral management affected East Africa regional security would be 75.5%.

Delloitte (2012) suggests the interconnectedness among the East Africa regional states in eco-socio-political fronts. It thus notes, the practical concerns from the expanded East African region stem from the dependency of all landlocked neighbours. For example, the stability of Kenya after the 2012-2013 elections will be vital for the entire Sudan’s economic development, as Kenya provides transportation, human resource, technical skills, and links to foreign Countries as well as several other governance assistances, particularly to the South Sudan.

It further notes, that most of the countries neighbouring Kenya within the larger EAC have economic interests relying heavily on Kenya’s road, air, and water transportation network, health, banking and trade services function. Any stability or instability before, during and after the coming elections will negatively impact their economies. The case of Uganda during the 2007 post elections violence point to this as well as a considerable number of states within the East African Community.

The Kenya’s 2007 election’s violence had wider impact across the East Africa region which reflected on its security. Crisis Group Africa Report (2008) indicates the economic pressures of the crisis as being felt not only in Kenya but also in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo and southern Sudan. Kenya is a transit point for a quarter of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Rwanda and Uganda and one third of Burundi’s. The targeting of Ugandan lorries in Kenya due to rumours of that Country’s military involvement in the west has also posed problems. Fuel shortages at one point prompted Uganda to suspend domestic flights.

CNN (2008) report further highlights that Dar es Salaam, the other major East African port, has been unable to handle additional trade due to slow clearance. The crisis will force landlocked East African Countries to re-evaluate their dependence on Kenya for imports and exports and consider a Tanzanian route if that Country’s infrastructure is improved.

According to Reuters (2008), On 8 January 2008, Finance Minister Amos Kimunya announced that he estimated Kenya would lose Ksh 60 billion ($885 million) due to the post-election crisis. In the early days, estimates put daily losses of tax revenues at approximately Ksh 2 billion ($29 million). This has likely increased over the past month as more and more sectors of the economy feel the effects of the crisis.

D. RESPONSE RATING WAYS IN WHICH KENYA’S 2007 ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT AFFECTED THE EAST AFRICA REGIONAL SECURITY

The data collected from the field and analyzed from a guided response show that property loss and refugees related issues were the most notable security issues arising from Kenya’s 2007 electoral management. This indicates either policies of open border due to integration process for trade and social exchanges or the long existing cultural disjoints where East African nations such as the Maasai, Kuria, Luo, West Pokots, and others find themselves spread across the border in two states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage of Property Losses</th>
<th>Refugees Related</th>
<th>Violation of Arms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While understanding challenges of electoral management is
important in this study, it is also important again to understand what constitutes regional security and in tackling such security, it would be appreciable to underscore the changes in regional security over time. As mentioned earlier in discussion of findings about causes of election’s violence that ‘Security is best defined by stability which allows socio-eco-political life of citizens to proceed relatively normal.

In a globalized world where regionalism has impacted on many adjacent state’s activities, security of one state transcends beyond borders’. From this statement, it is understandable then that any instabilities on economic activities of population across regions, human migrations of a magnitude transcending boundaries, and proliferations of likely facilitators of violence amounts to regional security which in a bigger sense (systemic sense) amounts to global security. In other words electoral (mis)management like the Kenya’s 2007 becomes a global security issue on the basis of actors involved and the impact it had variously.

Table 3: Descriptives for Causes of Insecurity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Sum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of Arms</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>1.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Related</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Losses</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>0.776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminals Regime</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawlessness</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>1.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (listwise)</td>
<td>172</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the Cold War, regional security and stability were defined largely in terms of the place that a region occupied in the strategic calculation of the United States or the Soviet Union. The contemporary preoccupation with regional security reflects a confluence of the continuing relevance of traditional geostrategic calculations and the emergence of new security challenges that have redefined the content and scope of order in the contemporary international system. The rising salience of regional security and regional security orders across every dimension of interaction has generated a surprisingly large number of formal international arrangements that vary in scope, complexity, and strength.

The scholarship on regional security is preoccupied with three major questions: First, what variables contribute to regional (in)stability and (dis)order?; Secondly, Is the Euro-Atlantic form of security governance transferable to other regions of the world? What is the nature of the interaction between the regional and international systems of order? (Sperling, 2015). From this discourse three issues arise in relation to regional security; variables, transferability, and nature of interactions.

**E. Effects of Kenya’s 2007 Election’s Management on her Neighbours**

Civil conflict is common in sub-Saharan Africa and in developing Countries in general (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Besides the Kenyan crisis (Dupas and Robinson, 2012), recent examples of social conflict generated by political instability include the disputed 2010 presidential election in Cote d’Ivoire, coups in Madagascar in early 2009 and Guinea in late 2008, state violence before the presidential election run-off in Zimbabwe in 2008, and riots following Benazir Bhutto's assassination in Pakistan in 2007, among others. Understanding how these sporadic yet recurrent episodes of social unrest affect households is critical.

A few months after the end of the civil conflict, 30% of the population reported a specific personal impact of the post-election violence (Gutiérrez-Romero et al., 2008). These impacts included personal injury, displacement, property destruction, and the death of friends or relatives. In addition to the direct effect on the victims of the violence, the political crisis and resulting civil conflict led to massive economic disruptions in January and February, as commercial transport was halted through much of the Country and market centers were closed. Areas dependent on transportation and imports or exports were particularly hard-hit (Glauser, 2008). While election-related violence is not unprecedented in Kenya, all evidence suggests that the intensity, duration and geographic reach of the 2007–08 crisis was unparalleled and generally unanticipated.

The Kenya’s election’s management effects of 2007 have continued to be felt in some neighbouring Countries to date, almost eight years since conflict erupted in Kenya. According to Keter (2015), reports in the Star Newspaper that, seven hundred and twenty Kenyans who took refuge in Uganda during the 2007-08 post – election violence are packing their bags to return home today. The displaced persons have been living at Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement Camp in Masindi District for the last seven years. They will arrive in the Country this afternoon.

Kibego (2014) over the same issue of refugees arising from Kenya’s 2007 election’s management notes, Struggling to survive in Uganda, Kenyans who fled the 2007-08 post-election violence are angry at their government's failure to return them home. On July 29, the refugees, mainly women led by Joyce Wambui, silently marched in small groups to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kiryandongo settlement. In a petition, they urged UNHCR to push their government to repatriate them as soon as possible. Wambui told The Observer that life in the settlement was getting harder, following the influx of refugees from South Sudan. "These days, we Kenyans do not get food aid from UNHCR, since last year in August. When South Sudanese came, they reduced on our land portions and now each of us has half an acre on which we cannot cultivate and feed [our families],” Wambui said. She said parents had lost control of their children, who had resorted to prostitution to survive.

The two stories are revelations of what interference in human habitation can cause to security. To the neighbouring states, the effect may be so instantaneous as to admissions into the refugee camps, conflicts among refugees for new entrants into a camp, pressure on existing supplies by the receiving government, and possibilities of arms proliferation by people fleeing threat. All these are either issues of immediate security or future security concerns. In Kibego’s report, though demonstration is an expression of fundamental rights, it can have backlash. Alternatively, when refugees feel starved much, they may resort to crime related activities which are security concerns. The implication of families losing control of their children has deep implications on security around the camp.

Though years have passed since the Kenya’s 2007 election, the report by Keter shows the long term effects of what election’s
management may lead to in the long run to neighbouring countries. According to the Star, the returnees are part of 4000 refugees who crossed into Uganda at the height of the clashes that displaced 600,000 Kenyans. The electoral mismanagement in Kenya in 2007 thus also creates an avenue through which refugee problem is enhanced among states.

According to Madanat (2015), when the effects of election’s management is viewed from refugee effect to its neighbours, it is worth underscoring the assertion that the countries that host refugees experience long-term economic, social, political and environmental impacts. Those impacts can have both positive and negative contributions depending on three factors: political economy of the hosting countries; urban-rural interactions; and the nature of the relationship between the host country and the refugees. Most of the studies that are done on refugees show that the political and security impacts of refugees tend to be negative on the host states. Refugees can pose considerable political and security risks for the host governments. They are a political force for their country of residence and the way they react to the politics of host country. Furthermore, their political relationship with their indigenous Country, have become important factors in influencing relations between the sending and receiving Countries.

In Madanat (2015), Gil Loescher, a professor at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford, stresses that too often refugees are perceived as a matter of international charity organizations, and not as political and security problem yet refugees are in fact intensely political. The presence of refugees accelerates existing internal conflicts in the host Countries.

A very fundamental argument arises out of Jacobsen (2002). He posits that refugees impose a variety of security, economic and environmental burdens on host Countries, but also embody a significant flow of resources in the form of international humanitarian assistance, economic assets and human capital. These refugee resources represent an important state building contribution to the host state, but security problems and other hindrances inhibit the state’s ability to access and control them.

Unlike in the study being conducted here, what Jacobsen in his latter statement insinuates does not seem feasible for refugee regime in the neighbourhood Countries of East Africa region. These are Countries which are almost at the same levels of development with little comparative advantages possessed by others. Kenya for many years though has grown to a giant economy among its peers in this region despite the 2007 electoral mismanagement.

Refugee flows present a challenge to one of the key principles of state sovereignty: the control of borders and of non-citizens in the Country. African host Countries experience a range of security related problems associated with refugees and others crossing the border from conflict ridden neighbouring Countries. The most serious of these problems is cross-border raids and the import of conflict from the sending Country (World Refugee Survey 2001).

Kirui and Mwaruvie (2012) support this fact thus the security dynamics in a refugee settlement are complex because of the spillover effects from refugees’ home Countries and the varied interests of both UNHCR, as a refugee agency, and host government as a law enforcement agency. It reveals that refugees and the host community often conflict over resources, systems of governance and other varied interests.

From Thailand experience, Brees (2010) observes, from the aftermath of 9/11 which led to heightened securitization of migration and anxieties about ‘the other’ that developing Countries which have to deal with mass influxes of refugees into their territory when the conflict of neighboring Countries spills over their borders need to be cognizant that refugees can pose a security threat to the host Country. For example, they can attract attacks from across the border which present a hazard to the local populations.

Developing countries that host refugees for protracted periods experience long-term economic, social, political, and environmental impacts. From the moment of arrival, refugees may compete with local citizens for scarce resources such as water, food, housing, and medical services. Their presence increases the demands for education, health services, infrastructure such as water supply, sanitation, and transportation, and also in some cases, for natural resources such as grazing and firewood. The impacts of the refugee presence are both positive and negative (UNHCR, 2004).

It is not only the refugees’ menace that arises as a problem to neighbouring states due to violence such as the Kenya’s 2007 election. The electoral management had other challenges too. More than 80% of Uganda’s imports pass through the port of Mombasa, as do almost all of Rwanda’s exports. According to the Uganda Manufacturers Association manufacturers had lost $43 USD million because of the delays, destruction of goods and slowed production caused by the Kenyan crisis (Kimani, 2008).

The regional security issues that may arise out of refugees spillovers into the neighbouring countries from the foregoing assertions may include: Expansion of rebel social networks and diffusion of violence. Facilitation of transnational spreading of arms, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict, and Creation of bilateral tensions.

Some examples include, the rebel group made up of mainly Uganda-based Tutsi refugees from Rwanda, which in October 1990 formed the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and invaded northern Rwanda (Lomo et al, 2001), World Development Report (2011) indicate refugees can also serve as domestic opposition groups in the host Country with material resources and motivation to wage their own armed battles. For instance, Somali refugees have often worked closely with ethnic Somali separatists in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and the involvement of Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda in the removal of the Milton Obote administration (1980-1985) (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006).

Issues of national security in the interdependent world are international security by nature. Mwalimu further expresses that the security dynamics of spillovers affect national in diverse ways. He aver that political threats undermine the organizational stability of the state threatening its national identity and its organizing ideology, as well as the institutions that express them while economic threats are most difficult to handle within the framework of national security, when their consequences reach beyond certain limits, economic deterioration weakens the power and strength of states, and enhances their internal and external insecurity. All these extend to social and environmental security issues. A state can significantly increase its vulnerability to civil war by absorbing refugee inflows from neighbouring Countries particularly if these nearby states experience episodes of internecine strife (Pini, 2011).

Overwhelming the respondents positively indicated that electoral management effects have spillover effects to adjacent
The spillover effects include; refugees influx, proliferation of small arms, cross border insecurity, hoarding of goods, price escalation, and high costs of imports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spill over effects to neighboring Countries</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Percent of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharing of Mombasa port</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.7% 4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees status, influx</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45.9% 57.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weakened socio-economic ties</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.7% 4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference with bilateral trade suffered, disrupted</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19.3% 24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of movement halted</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.7% 4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of small arms</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.7% 4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergence of criminals taking advantage</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.8% 3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross border insecurity</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17.4% 21.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0% 125.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In table 14.6, the effects pertaining human migration is spotted to be the highest spillover effect at 45.9%. This is closely followed by interferences to do with economic activities which include a mention of lack of access to the port of Mombasa for hinterland countries such as Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan. The analysis further to some extent existence of possibility of arms proliferations across the border and likelihood of emergence of criminal gangs taking advantage of the situation. Coupled with indication of cross border insecurity at 17.4%, the spillover effects of electoral management in countries within this region from the experience of Kenya undoubtedly reminiscent existence of serious human security both to the affected country and other nearby states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kenya’s 2007 election mgmt effects EACa</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Percent of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delay in goods on transit &amp; passenger flight, slow, disrupted bilateral trade,</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28.00% 46.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of essential good, supplies e.g. fuel</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20.30% 33.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High prices of goods, food insecurity</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14.00% 23.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political classes were affected</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.90% 8.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected Security of Non Kenyans</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.10% 3.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference with tourism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.10% 3.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human migration/ refugees</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.40% 14.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Creation of social suspicion            | 3         | 2.10% 3.50%     |
| Economic losses                         | 10        | 7.00% 11.60%    |
| Interference with Imports and Exports   | 12        | 8.40% 14.00%    |
| No effect                               | 4         | 2.80% 4.70%     |

| **Total**                               | **143**   | **100.00% 166.30%** |

On the basis of multiple data of respondents, the study in trying to find out the general effects of the Kenya’s 2007 electoral management to the neighbouring states highlights such effects as; delay in goods destined for trade, passenger flight disruptions, lack of essential goods and supplies such as fuel in a number of destinations within and outside Kenya, high prices of goods, interference with tourism, and human migrations for safety. There is some semblance between the general effects depicted here and the spillover effects discussed earlier on.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects Replication to East Africa regional statesa</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Percent of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economically, Trade Affected</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24.10% 30.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Insecurity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28.70% 36.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sour bilateral ties,</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.90% 8.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear, panic, refugee influx problem</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17.20% 21.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel shortages</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.90% 8.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of movement of people &amp; goods</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.40% 4.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no effect, least effect</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.60% 15.90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Total**                                         | **87**    | **100.00% 126.10%** |

The findings in this table above confirm like the other question
variables that indeed the Kenya’s 2007 electoral management effects replicated security effects to the neighbouring states. This happened in the form of hampered trade, food insecurity, creating fear and panic among people, fuel shortages, and blocking intended social exchanges. However, as is seen in the table below, previously Kenya’s election’s violence have not been a regional problem. They have always incubated and hatched with minimum effects that don’t affect other regional states to greater extents. The statistics from the study though indicate that despite them being relatively internal in nature as far as effects are concerned, imports and exports have been affected.

CONCLUSIONS

The realization of joint regional security is dawning a reality on the East African Community (EAC) states. During the 16th Ordinary Summit of the EAC Heads of states held in Nairobi, the presiding chairman made remarks to this effect. According to Daily Nation (2015), President Uhuru of Kenya said;

“Numerous milestones have been made in the different sectors of education, health, culture and sports, trade and movements among others. However, the realization of a large regional economic bloc bears great strategic and geopolitical significance, imposing on EAC Partner States enormous responsibility for regional defense and security. To ensure a regional approach on foreign policy, we have put in place a Protocol on Foreign Policy Coordination. As the economic, social and cultural integration process gathers pace, it is now time to move beyond these deeper integration, driven by political federation that will facilitate peace, security, stability; good neighbourliness and economic development.”

Recommendations

The above discussions statement therefore prompts the question of what constitutes security of states in light of challenges of elections management to security in a regional complex. In my thinking, security of states is anchored on three main areas; economic stability, social stability, and political stability. The interplay between these three will determine security and in adjacent states it determines regional security. So to suggest, the greater part of East Africa region suffered security due to the electoral management in Kenya in 2007. This is a more generalized view because each aspect mentioned has other dynamics in terms of security. The social and political for example can be attributed to forced human migrations fleeing hot spots of election violence.

The latest is where Burundi is embroiled in violent clashes. Beauchamp observes that the violence could also provoke a regional refugee crisis. Given that 50,000 Burundians have already fled the country, Jones thinks the total number displaced could get as high as 350,000 if the conflict escalates. That would be both a humanitarian and security crisis. According to both Schwartz and Jones, massive refugee flows in Africa’s Great Lakes region, where Burundi is located, tend to have destabilizing effects on the entire region. The issue of security in Africa today is becoming more and more a priority that may not be ignored in policy making. The realization (Daily Nation, 2015) of joint regional security is dawning a reality on the East African Community (EAC) states. During the 16th Ordinary Summit of the EAC Heads of states held in Nairobi, the presiding chairman made remarks to this effect. President Uhuru of Kenya said; “... As the economic, social and cultural integration process gathers pace, it is now time to move beyond these to deeper integration, driven by political federation that will facilitate peace, security, stability; good neighbourliness and economic development.”

It is evident that the 2007 Kenya’s electoral management affected East Africa regional security to a great extent. This implies a regional approach in the wake of regional integration should be adopted in finding better ways of ameliorating future similar occurrences. The problem however is that almost all the countries in the East Africa region seem to have a similar level of growth in their democracy. At one point they seem moving towards maturity while drastically falling into tatters, may be a serious economic integration would be a means of guarding the desired regional security by all involved without caring ethnic affiliations.

According to Buzan and Weaver adjacent states should have common security approaches since such states normally insulate each other in problems because of geographic proximity. Other scholars such as Solingen and Acharya tend to back this position by Buzan and Weaver but move further to theorize like the researcher that the best way to manage these kind of security spillovers among states in a fast regionalizing world is by the adoption of Regional Institutional Perspective Theory (RIPT). With this, states need to enhance the capacity of institutions of governance and security in as much as they enhance economic institutions through regional integration.

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